Not a Storm in a Teacup: The Islamic State after the Caliphate by Almohamad, Selman
www.ssoar.info
Not a Storm in a Teacup: The Islamic State after the
Caliphate
Almohamad, Selman
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Arbeitspapier / working paper
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Almohamad, S. (2021). Not a Storm in a Teacup: The Islamic State after the Caliphate. (GIGA Focus Nahost, 3).
Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA) - Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien,
Institut für Nahost-Studien. https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-72844-7
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY-ND Lizenz (Namensnennung-
Keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu
den CC-Lizenzen finden Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY-ND Licence
(Attribution-NoDerivatives). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0





German Institute for Global and 
Area Studies (GIGA)
Leibniz-Institut für Globale  
und Regionale Studien





Not a Storm in a Teacup:  
The Islamic State after the Caliphate
GIGA Focus | Middle East | Number 3 | April 2021 | ISSN 1862-3611
Despite the loss of its territorial “caliphate” in 2019, the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria (IS) still poses a daily threat to the societies of the region and 
beyond. To account for the resurgence of IS, we need to look at its dyna-
mism, in addition to the domestic and regional complexities that facilitate 
its persistence in Iraq and Syria.
 • The gradual, drastic loss of territorial control in Iraq and Syria since 2015 has 
deprived IS of crucial assets to launch large-scale terrorist attacks and com-
pelled it to change its tactics.
 • Since 2019, IS has intensified its guerilla warfare and, by destabilising large 
parts of Syria and Iraq, managed to maintain leverage in those areas.
 • The organisational and ideological cohesion of IS has not deteriorated signifi-
cantly, even after losing its territorial base and its “caliph,” Abu Bakr al-Bagh-
dadi.
 • IS exploits the political, security, social, and economic fragmentations that con-
tinue to plague both Iraq and Syria and that contributed to its rise in the first 
place. 
 • Refugee camps and detention centres, especially in northeast Syria, are cur-
rently being targeted by IS for infiltration and radicalisation. If these campaigns 
are successful, IS may be able to regain thousands of fighters.
Policy Implications
The EU should increase its support vis-à-vis the refugee camps in Syria and Iraq 
by providing humanitarian aid and adopting an institutionalised policy for re-
patriating its citizens who have joined IS, along with their families. This should 
be complemented by measures of prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration. 
If not addressed efficiently, today’s legal conundrums and poor humanitarian 
conditions of European citizen detainees could become tomorrow’s security chal-
lenges.
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The End of the Islamic State’s Caliphate
In 2017 the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (IS) lost control over its former capital, 
Mosul. Two years later, in 2019, IS was defeated in the Syrian town of Baghouz. 
These two events marked the end of the “caliphate” as a territorial, quasi-state pro-
ject that, at its height, had conquered swaths of land in Iraq and Syria almost equal 
in size to the territory of the United Kingdom. Despite its loss of territory, IS has 
not been terminated. Instead, various signals in 2020 and early 2021 suggest IS’s 
continued local resilience and tentative resurgence.
However, the emergence and resurgence of IS cannot be seen as isolated from 
the multifaceted obstacles that Iraq and Syria face. The persistence of IS is due 
both to its own characteristics and to the contextual conditions in these two Middle 
Eastern countries. In this vein, it is still unclear precisely how and when IS can be 
terminated in the long term. What is clear, however, is that some additional action 
can be taken in the short run to foreclose IS’s attempts to radicalise and recruit ci-
vilian populations – especially in refugee camps in Iraq and Syria – by, for instance, 
intensifying humanitarian support as well as repatriating foreign fighters and their 
families.
The Islamic State’s Caliphate as a Proto-State
An offshoot of al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), IS first emerged in Iraq in 2006 under the 
name the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI). Later, it faded into obscurity mainly due to 
the heavy presence of US troops in Iraq. In 2011 IS re-emerged and expanded its 
operations into Syria under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Raqqa (Syria) 
and Mosul (Iraq) fell into the hands of IS in 2014, and the “caliphate” of the Islamic 
State was subsequently declared (The Wilson Center 2019). Relatedly, an examina-
tion of IS’s targets has revealed that the organisation attacks both state security 
forces and civilians. This blurs the analytical classification of IS as being either a 
guerrilla movement or a terrorist organisation. In reality, IS embodies the charac-
teristics of both terrorist and guerrilla groups.  
At its height, IS controlled a territory that stretched from Aleppo, in northwest-
ern Syria, to Diyala, in northeastern Iraq. This, in turn, enabled the terrorist organi-
sation to enlarge its resources of funds and manpower through human trafficking 
(especially of children and women); collection of zakat (Islamic alms) from farm-
ers; amassing revenues from oil, gas, and phosphate fields and refineries; trading in 
agricultural products; smuggling archaeological artefacts; kidnapping for ransom; 
holding cash currency from banks and taxing bank transactions; and accumulating 
illicit taxes from transit areas. Through the control of income resources, logistical 
routes, and a delineated territory, IS was able to exert proto-state functions such 
as levying taxes; applying Sharia law and an Islamic judicial system; designing and 
imposing an “Islamic” curriculum for schools; and providing basic services such as 
electricity (FATF 2015: 12–24).
Ideological activism, too, was on the IS agenda, as it relied on different media 
to convey various messages in pursuit of three main objectives: to disseminate its 
ideology, to recruit new members, and to raise funds for its operations. IS drew on 
the modern networks of communication technology to establish an array of outlets, 
   3    GIGA FOCUS | MIDDLE EAST | NO. 3 | APRIL 2021 
such as al-Hayat Media Center, the magazine Dabiq, and Amaq News Agency. Also, 
it was present and active on social media applications such as Telegram, and used 
the internet to post videos of hostages being beheaded. In terms of the content of IS 
propaganda, the organisation called for a “holy war” (jihad); used language that re-
ferred to the “caliphate”; and invoked verses from the Qur’an, Hadith, and Islamic 
jurisprudence (fiqh). A further alarming aspect of IS discourse was its view of the 
Shiites as rejectors (rawafidh) and of other minority groups, such as the Christians 
and Yazidis, as heretics. 
In response to the regional and global menace that IS represented, in 2014 the 
United States began an international campaign to counter the dispersion of this 
proto-state. This initiative came to be known as the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS 
and was supplemented by the establishment of the Combined Joint Task Force – 
Operation Inherent Resolve (CJTF–OIR), which entailed a partnership of 64 coun-
tries – some from the Gulf region (including the United Arab Emirates and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) and from the EU (including Germany, France, and Italy) – 
whose principal mission was to defeat IS. In Iraq, Operation Inherent Resolve coor-
dinates with the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), and the armed forces of 
the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – the Peshmerga. In Syria, the United 
States’ primary partner is the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), which 
operates in the northeast. The US-led military campaign and its partners on the 
ground managed to take back the territory of the Islamic State in 2019 through co-
ordinated military airstrikes, surveillance, reconnaissance, and field battles. On the 
request of the Iraqi government, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) es-
tablished a new non-combat mission in Iraq in 2018 that was designed to build the 
capacity of the Iraqi Army and ISF via education, training, mentoring, and advisory 
activities to prevent the resurgence of IS. In 2020 NATO defence ministers came to 
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A Deadly Insurgency on the Rise 
Having lost control of territory, many IS fighters fled to unpopulated, deserted vil-
lages and/or loosely governed areas, whereas others dissipated into civilian com-
munities seeking safe havens. Further, the group turned to guerilla insurgency 
tactics of forming small fighting units that use surprise attacks, targeted assassina-
tions, and improvised explosive devices (IED). One of IS’s imperatives today is to 
retain leverage in border areas between Syria and Iraq and between Iraq and Iran 
to secure free movement of its fighters and collect illicit taxes from the trade and 
oil routes. A second current imperative is to stymie the return of stabilisation and 
normalisation to liberated areas (Al-Hashimi 2020).
The organisational and operational capacities of IS have survived degeneration 
and collapse. The killing of IS “caliph” Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in 2019 was followed 
by a seemingly undisputed leadership transition to the new and still less known 
“caliph,” Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi. On the level of operations, decision 
making has been further devolved to the discretion of unit commanders in the field. 
Likewise, the theatres of IS activities have been divided into province-based sectors 
(wilaya), whereby Iraq, for example, is divided into 11 IS operations sectors. As a 
result, even though IS lost its last territorial redoubt and its first “caliph” in 2019, it 
weathered these existential threats and managed to preserve its internal cohesion 
without fracturing or splintering (Hassan 2020).
The scale of IS attacks in Iraq and Syria in 2020 and early 2021 may attest 
to the resurgence of the group. For instance, between July and September 2020, 
IS conducted 228 attacks in Iraq and 131 in Syria (U.S. Department of Defense 
2020: 19–23). Most of these attacks took place in the two border provinces of Di-
yala (Iraqi–Iranian border) and Deir ez-Zor (Syrian–Iraqi border), which hints at 
the noticeable presence of IS across border areas. In the same vein, IS seems to be 
escalating its operations in 2021: In January, 153 members of the Syrian regime 
forces and their supporting militias were killed by IS in various areas stretching 
from Aleppo, Hama, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor to the Homs desert (part of the Badia) 
(al-Kanj 2021). Similarly, IS advanced its presence from the outskirts of Iraqi cities 
to hit central Baghdad on 21 January with two suicide bombings that left 32 people 
dead and more than 100 wounded.
Currently, the most intractable among the activities of IS might be its financial 
schemes. In 2015, when the “caliphate” was at its zenith, IS earnings and holdings 
reached an estimated USD 6 billion (Warrick 2018). The fall of the territorial reign 
of IS had deprived it of valuable resources that came with conquering territory, such 
as direct revenues from trading in natural resources and taxes from the populations 
under its control. However, IS today is not financially burdened by the need to se-
cure and maintain the territorial holdings that it once seized. Also, the obligation to 
equip and pay salaries to large numbers of fighters or to fund large-scale armed op-
eration has diminished significantly. This may leave IS with more latitude to focus 
on eclectic violence and pick its targeted attacks more rationally.
As former IS commanders reveal, in 2017 when IS was ousted from Raqqa, the 
organisation transported millions of dollars from Raqqa to the city of Baghouz, to 
which IS leaders and fighters headed and resided until 2019 (Al-Ghadhawi 2020). 
Money laundering also represents a major asset for IS today, as it invests its cash 
holdings in “legitimate” commercial and business enterprises such as hotels, real 
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estate, and car dealerships across Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and the United Arab Emir-
ates (Kenner 2019). Further, to evade traceable banking transactions, IS draws on 
a complex web of money services businesses (MSB), hawala systems, and financial 
facilitators to move its illicit funds. For years, the Office of Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC) at the US Department of the Treasury has been tracking and designating 
networks, entities, and individuals who collaborate in funding or facilitating the 
financial operations of IS. Between 2018 and 2019, for example, the OFAC desig-
nated the Iraqi-based MSB Afaq Dubai and the network coordinated by financier 
Fawaz Muhammad Jubair al-Rawi as circumventing the banking system via reli-
ance on hawalas to move money for IS across the Middle East, Africa, and Europe 
(U.S. Department of the Treasury 2019).
Fragmentations in Iraq and Syria are Conducive to IS’s  
Resurgence
IS has adapted to the loss of its territorial “caliphate” by adjusting its warring tactics 
and financial practices, consolidating the cohesion of its organisational and ideo-
logical constructs, and bolstering its operational resilience. However, it is mislead-
ing to isolate IS from the broader developments in Syria and Iraq and to assume 
that IS’s resurgence can be ascribed merely to its adroit adaptability.
In Iraq, the drop in oil prices added to the economic and political malfunctions 
of the government and contributed to the outbreak of mass protests in October 
2019. COVID-19 compounded the situation, further straining the performance of 
the government. Also, the successive governments of Iraq have been characterised 
by the endemic blurring of the boundaries between state security institutions and 
the myriad Iran-backed Shiite militias. Similarly, disputes between the government 
in Baghdad and the KRG over issues of influence and governance in provinces such 
as Kirkuk created security gaps that enabled IS to increase its attacks there. 
On a different level, we do not yet know how US–Iranian relations under the 
new US administration of Joseph Biden will affect Iraq. However, the partial US 
military withdrawal from Iraq following the directives of former president Donald 
Trump had already emboldened the Shiite militias in Iraq against the US and had 
also given IS more latitude to stage new attacks at the expense of the Iraqi state. An-
other international engagement with Iraq whose progress should be re-evaluated is 
that of NATO and, within its framework, the German military. As mentioned before, 
in 2020 NATO decided to extend its non-combatant mission in Iraq. Likewise, the 
German Bundestag agreed in October 2020 to prolong the German military pres-
ence in Iraq until January 2022 within the frameworks of the NATO mission and 
the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. The call to re-evaluate the achievements of the 
German and NATO efforts is primarily based on two facts: First, when the October 
protests kicked off, mainly in central and southern Iraq, the ISF (along with some 
militias) used excessive force and live ammunition to quell the mass movement, 
resulting in the killing of more than 500 protesters (Alsaafin 2020). Second, the 
twin suicide attacks in central Baghdad in early 2021 attest to the fragile security 
situation and the dearth of stability even after years of international programmes 
designed to stabilise the country.
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In Syria, too, IS has ample fragmentations to avail itself of. The country is divid-
ed into discrete zones of military, economic, and political control. The areas where 
IS is most robust lie in the northeast, where the US-backed SDF holds control. How-
ever, tensions between the SDF and Turkey have led the latter to undertake three 
incursions into northern Syria (in 2016, 2018, and 2019) to protect what Ankara 
claims is its national security. Additionally, the complexity of the security land-
scape has created ungoverned spaces, such as the Homs desert, which has seen an 
increase in IS attacks. The longevity of the war in Syria and the stalled peace process 
in compliance with UN Resolution 2254 only add to the challenge that IS poses for 
local communities in terms of intimidation, displacement, and recruitment.
In short, the destruction of IS entails addressing the initial factors that enabled 
it to emerge in the first place. Those factors exceed IS-related aspects of resilience 
and touch upon the structural obstacles of Syria and Iraq that allow IS to thrive.
IS and the Refugee Camps in Syria and Iraq
IS terrorism and the fight against it have rendered hundreds of thousands of per-
sons in Syria and Iraq homeless and displaced. In turn, various refugee camps and 
detention centres have been established in the two countries. As of December 2020, 
Iraq had more than 1,220,000 internally displaced persons (IDP) and hosted ap-
proximately 330,000 refugees. Of the refugees, more than 240,000 are Syrians, 
40,000 are of other nationalities, and 47,000 are stateless. Whereas 60 per cent of 
the refugees in Iraq reside in urban areas, most of the rest are dispersed in refugee 
camps in the northern Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI).
In Syria, thousands of families and individuals have been displaced and hosted 
in camps, tents, farms, schools, and buildings in the country’s northwest, south, 
and northeast. However, IS fighters and their families were generally displaced in 
the northeast between the governorates of Deir ez-Zor, Raqqa, and Hasaka. Relat-
edly, al-Hawl camp in northeastern Syria has received broad attention from the UN, 
state governments, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) due to its hosting 
of more than 64,000 refugees and IDPs, of whom 80 per cent are women and chil-
dren. Al-Hawl and Roj refugee camps in northeast Syria are detaining 31,000 for-
eign children under terrible humanitarian and security conditions, without proper 
healthcare or education (Middle East Monitor 2021).
A report submitted to the UN Security Council in February 2021 (U.N. Security 
Council 2021: 18–20) describes instances of radicalisation, minors’ indoctrination, 
and training at al-Hawl camp. Furthermore, funds have been reported to be pour-
ing into and flowing out of al-Hawl camp to support the families of IS members 
and finance their escapes from the camp. Those funds mostly take the form of re-
mittances sent to recipients in neighbouring countries through registered banking 
sectors, to then be transferred to the camp through hawala companies and MSB. 
The UN report estimates the number of male IS fighters who are detained in 
northeastern Syria to be approximately 11,000, of which 2,000 are foreign terror-
ist fighters (FTF) from 60 nationalities; 1,600 are Iraqi nationals; 5,000 are Syr-
ian nationals; and 2,500 are of unknown nationality. COVID-19 has aggravated the 
poor humanitarian conditions at the detention facilities. It has also challenged the 
capacity of the Kurdish de facto authorities who manage and secure the camps and 
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detention centres in northern Syria, causing a drop in the number of guards from 
1,500 in 2019 to 400 by late 2020. 
In 2021 violence in al-Hawl camp, including the murder rate, has continued to 
rise. This drove the SDF and its internal security force (Asayish) to launch a secu-
rity campaign between 28 March and 2 April against alleged IS sleeper cells in the 
camp. As a result, 125 suspected IS members were arrested, and military supplies 
and electronic circuits that can be used in explosive devices were found. 
The brittle security landscape in Syria and Iraq, in addition to the humanitarian and 
economic burdens imposed by COVID-19 on state and non-state actors alike, may 
Figure 2 
Syria: Locations of 
Assessed IDP Camps 




Iraq: Camp Closure 
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prompt IS to plan for intensive jailbreaks in 2021. If such a scenario materialises, 
IS will welcome thousands of its battle-hardened operatives back into its ranks, 
reversing the effects of years of fighting and magnifying its threat level.
The need to protect the vulnerable IDPs and refugee groups who live in the 
camps under degrading conditions has been underscored by various local and in-
ternational entities. In addition, the UN has repeatedly called for the repatriation 
of foreign children, women, and detained IS fighters. However, the international 
response has been far from satisfactory; on the contrary, only a very limited num-
ber of sporadic and case-by-case repatriations have been undertaken by countries 
such as Germany and France. Unless IS’s capacity to prey on the camps is curtailed, 
today’s children could turn into tomorrow’s second IS generation.
Two Possible Ways Forward for the EU
The drastic losses that IS faced in Syria and Iraq have not prevented it from mutat-
ing into a terrorist insurgent organisation that continues to propagate extremism 
and spread violence and instability across the Middle East. However, the battles 
that IS wages are not confined to the military, ideological, and economic realms. 
Rather, the infiltration and radicalisation of refugee camps comprise a palpable ob-
jective for IS to foster its potential in recruiting would-be fighters and maintain its 
social and ideological ties to the overcrowded camps and incarceration centres.
If the resurgence and resilience of IS and the continued turmoil in Iraq and Syr-
ia hamper the ability of those fighting the organisation to envision how and when 
to destroy it, then the EU must contrive a more realistic and operable policy. In 
short, this policy should aim to protect refugees and vulnerable groups in the camps 
in northeast Syria and Iraq via intensifying the EU’s humanitarian support within 
the camps by empowering the local authorities who administer these camps until a 
comprehensive EU blueprint for repatriating its citizens is ready. 
More specifically, the immediate, short-term plan of the EU should be to miti-
gate the deteriorating conditions of everyone in the camps by improving the liveli-
hood circumstances there via the provision of food, health services, clothing, shelter 
kits, child protection measures, juvenile rehabilitation facilities, and the like. Here, 
it is worth remembering that the EU continues to allocate large funds to achieve 
similar tasks and was recently the largest donor at the Brussels V Conference, 
where it assigned EUR 3.7 billion to support Syria and the neighbouring countries 
that host Syrian refugees. However, efforts should be intensified to meet the rising 
humanitarian challenges, especially given COVID-19 and the indefinite closure of 
al-Yarubiyya crossing point between Syria and Iraq due to the Russian veto that 
stopped the UN humanitarian agencies delivering aid from Iraq to Syria. Improving 
livelihood conditions is not unachievable, given the presence of many UN agencies, 
local and international NGOs, and other partners in the field with whom the EU can 
coordinate. The second pillar of this immediate plan could be to buttress the mana-
gerial and financial capacities of the local partners who maintain and safeguard the 
camps. In this regard, and especially in northeastern Syria, the EU should provide 
the Kurdish authorities with the needed expertise and resources to run the camps 
and detention facilities, in addition to, for instance, helping them overcome finan-
cial shortfalls affecting the number of guards and wardens they are able to employ.
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In the meantime, the EU should prepare a mid-term plan for repatriating its 
citizens who have joined IS. This includes male IS fighters, their wives, and their 
children (most of whom were born in Syria or Iraq and are legally stateless). Of 
course, this is a significant challenge and may face obstacles due to political con-
siderations and the individual legal systems of each EU member state, whereby 
ascertaining the involvement of the repatriated in terrorism, in addition to vetting 
and prosecuting them, are difficult tasks. However, with proper legal amendments 
and phase-based programmes for prosecution, rehabilitation, and reintegration, re-
patriation might be accomplished.
Finally, why would the EU adopt such a policy? The answer is, briefly, bifur-
cated: First, there is a normative imperative to uphold the ethical and human rights 
values of protecting vulnerable groups, including children and women. Second, re-
patriation of EU citizens and their families who joined IS cuts the latter’s chances of 
infiltrating the camps and spreading IS ideology. Of course, the repatriation of Eu-
ropean IS members is not a panacea for radicalisation within the camps, especially 
when thousands of extremists are non-EU citizens. However, a move by the EU on 
this matter is indispensable for setting an international agenda on how to address 
the challenge of FTFs, and for making a solution to the local terrorists’ situation in 
the camps more discernable in the future. Forestalling a second generation of IS 
terrorism needs to be at the core of the EU’s plan, which should be implemented 
without delay.
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